ABSTRACT Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) intrusion has long been a major issue in network security. Anomaly detection methods for detecting such intrusions have been shown to be highly effective, as they learn patterns from the characteristics of normal HTTP messages and search for deviations to detect anomalous messages. Various anomaly detection schemes have been proposed using deep learning algorithms, which require a set of input features to represent an HTTP message. However, heuristically selected input features result in limited performance owing to their lack of understanding of HTTP messages. Recently, it has been shown that documents can be successfully classified by binary images transformed from documents at the character level as the input features for a convolutional neural network (CNN). Thus, document classification is possible without any prior knowledge of words, syntactics, or semantics. This motivates us to mitigate the issue of heuristically selected features in anomaly detection, as HTTP messages also consist of characters. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection technique for HTTP messages by using a convolutional autoencoder (CAE) with character-level binary image transformation. The CAE consists of an encoder and a decoder with CNN structures that are symmetrical to each other. Furthermore, when an image that has been transformed from a message is submitted to the CAE, it tries to produce a similar image. Toward this end, the CAE is trained to minimize the binary cross entropy (BCE) between the input and output images for normal messages. After adequate training, the proposed scheme can detect an anomalous message if its BCE is larger than a prespecified threshold value. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme outperforms conventional machine learning schemes, such as a one-class support vector machine and an isolation forest, which use heuristically selected input features. In addition, it is shown that improved performance can be achieved by using a deeper CAE structure and a new decision variable, namely binary cross varentropy, instead of BCE. Finally, to investigate the validity of the characterlevel image transformation, we employ a character embedding in the image transformation, which requires additional computational load but achieves negligible performance improvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network intrusion activities, such as phishing and web threats in existing web application services and network servers, have been a major issue in network security. Recently, it was reported that phishing attacks increased by around 57 times between 2004 and 2017 [1] . Moreover, around 8% of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) messages in 2017 were reported to be malicious [2] . Consequently, network intrusion detection, which aims to prevent damage from such attacks, has emerged as a major topic of research [3] .
To detect malicious HTTP messages, signature detection schemes employ a set of specific signatures that are constructed by analyzing known malicious messages. Although these schemes are highly effective against known attack patterns, they must explore new attack patterns to detect new types of attacks. As a significant number of new types of attacks occur every day, system performance can be easily degraded if the signature set is not updated regularly [3] , [4] . Unlike signature detection schemes, an anomaly detection scheme targets message patterns that show unusual behavior compared to normal patterns; hence, it can detect any attack without prior knowledge of new types of attacks. Toward this end, the anomaly detection scheme first builds models for normal HTTP messages by monitoring them in a network. Then, these models are used to detect any anomalous HTTP message [3] , [5] .
A Markov chain has been employed to model normal HTTP messages for anomalous HTTP message detection [6] . Specifically, the Markov chain is used to evaluate the conditional probability of a character given the previous one within each normal message. Once the Markov chain is constructed, the probability of a sequence of characters in a given message can be estimated. Because any pattern of unexpected characters in the sequence within a given anomalous message occurs with a low probability, it can be detected. A pattern recognition technique has been proposed to identify anomalies in images representing network traffic [7] . To represent network traffic in images, the address and port in the header information within network traffic are used to map their usage frequencies into two-dimensional images. Several clustering and anomaly detection algorithms have been adopted to describe normal behavior [8] . In particular, the algorithms extract input features from HTTP logs and construct a model of the normal messages to detect anomalous message as deviations. The input features are generated using all unique n-grams of sequences, the Internet Protocol (IP) address, the requested web resource and its attributes, the number of transferred bytes, and the server response code from HTTP logs. Thus, in the above-mentioned methods, a set of features is heuristically selected to represent normal behavior. It has been shown that these methods can easily produce high false positive rates, as they lack deliberate feature selection [3] , [9] .
Conventional machine learning techniques for anomaly detection require considerable domain expertise to extract a set of input features that represent natural data in their raw form. Thus, their performance heavily depends on how the set of input features is chosen. Unlike conventional machine learning techniques, a deep neural network (DNN) can automatically extract abstract features from raw data that are suitable for detection or classification tasks [10] . Specifically, a DNN consists of multiple hidden layers, with each layer transforming its inputs into a slightly more abstract representation. Through a composition of a sufficient number of such transformations, a DNN can extract abstract features and learn various tasks from them. On the basis of this property, an auto-encoder (AE) is commonly employed to detect anomalous data [11, Ch. 3] . It consists of a DNN-based encoder and decoder that are symmetrical to each other. The encoder extracts abstract features from the input data, whereas the decoder receives the extracted features from the encoder and produces an output that is close as possible to the input data [12] . Thus, when normal data are received, the AE will produce outputs that are similar to them. For anomalous data, the AE will produce significantly different outputs and can hence detect the anomalous data [11, Ch. 3] .
Network anomaly detection schemes that use DNN have attracted attention because of the need to model normal behaviors [13] . An AE-based anomaly detection system has been proposed using input features such as each user's categorized attributes and activity counts from system logs [14] . It detects anomalous behavior on the basis of the reconstruction error between the input features and the reproduced output from the AE. Input features including 41 elements, such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and temporal message information, have been used for network intrusion detection within NSL-KDD datasets [15] . In this scheme, the AE is trained to extract abstract features by using NSL-KDD datasets. Then, supervised learning is adopted to train a soft-max regression model by using these abstract features as input with some labeled data.
From the above-mentioned studies, it can be inferred that the detection performance improves if the input features are deliberately selected, as the DNN extracts abstract features from the given input features. However, the input features are not always guaranteed to reflect the characteristics of normal messages if they are selected heuristically. Therefore, the performance of anomalous HTTP message detection is likely to be limited if the input features are not chosen carefully. For instance, it would be difficult to detect certain types of anomalous messages containing some input features whose characteristics are similar to those of normal messages. Furthermore, we cannot determine their similarities in advance, i.e., before they actually occur. Document classification involves the same issue, as heuristically selected input features including word n-gram, bag of words, and word2vec are employed [16] - [18] . The convolutional representation of expressions (CREPE) scheme has been proposed to mitigate this issue [19] . This scheme employs character-level binary images transformed from documents as input features for a convolutional neural network (CNN) and trains it using a supervised learning process with labeled documents. The advantage of using character-level image transformation is that it does not require prior knowledge of the syntactic or semantic structures of a language. Moreover, it is applicable to various language as well as emoticons. This approach is expected to overcome the issues associated with heuristic selection, such as limited representation and information loss in documents.
Because an HTTP message also consists of a set of characters, the character-level binary image transformation technique proposed in [19] is expected to mitigate the issue of input feature selection in anomalous HTTP message detection. However, CREPE was developed to classify documents using supervised learning, which requires a set of labeled data for training. Thus, for anomaly detection, the structure needs to be modified with unsupervised learning. Toward this end, a convolutional autoencoder (CAE) consisting of an encoder and a decoder with CNN structures has been proposed [20] . As in the case of the AE, the encoder and the decoder are symmetrical to each other. Furthermore, the encoder extracts abstract features from the input binary image, and the decoder then uses the extracted features to produce an output image that is as close as possible to the input image. Toward this end, the CAE is trained by minimizing the binary cross entropy (BCE) between the input image transformed from normal messages and its corresponding output image [21] . Once it is trained, the CAE can detect anomalous messages because the difference between the input image and the corresponding output image would be considerable compared to that in the case of a normal message [11, Ch. 3] .
In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection technique for HTTP messages by using a CAE with character-level binary image transformation. The CAE consists of an encoder and a decoder. Structurally, the encoder is a modified version of Inception-ResNet-v2, which is a state-of-the-art CNN that achieves high accuracy on the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Competition (ILSVRC) benchmark [22] . The structure of the decoder is symmetrical to that of the encoder. After being trained by minimizing the BCE in the case of normal messages, the proposed CAE produces outputs for anomalous messages that are expected to have various values. To reflect this property, we employ binary cross varentropy (BCV) as a decision variable, as defined in [23] , as well as BCE to determine whether a given message is normal or anomalous. To the best of the authorsâĂŹ knowledge, BCV has not been employed for anomaly detection thus far. To evaluate the validity of the proposed scheme, we compare its performance with that of a one-class support vector machine (SVM) [24] and an isolation forest (IF) [25] , which use heuristically selected input features. In addition, we adopt a character embedding in the image transformation to evaluate the effectiveness of the image transformation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the basic structure of the CAE, which has inspired the structural design of the proposed scheme, and BCE as a loss function of CAE. Section III explains the process of character-level binary image transformation of HTTP messages and outlines the network structure of the proposed scheme. In addition, it describes the decision variables of BCE and BCV for anomaly detection.
To investigate the validity of character-level image transformation, we consider a character embedding in the transformation. For comparison, Section IV briefly describes other schemes, including a CREPE-based CAE, a one-class SVM, and an IF. Furthermore, a heuristic configuration of input features is provided, which is used for the one-class SVM and IF. Section V evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme and compares it with that of the other schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF CAE
In this section, we will provide an overview of the CAE. First, we introduce the basic concept of the AE and BCE as its loss function. Then, we describe the basic structure of the CAE.
A. BACKGROUND OF AE
The AE is based on a neural network structure. Specifically, it is constructed by concatenating an encoder and a decoder, each of which has a feedforward neural network with multiple hidden fully connected layers [12] . Using this structure, the encoder extracts the abstract features from the input features and the decoder produces the outputs similar to the input features from the extracted abstract features. Because the objective is to reproduce the input features at the output of the decoder, both the input and the output must have the same number of dimensions, L. The number of dimensions of the abstract features, H , is lower than L. Furthermore, the AE consists of many layers as required, usually placed symmetrically in the encoder and decoder. Fig. 1 shows the AE structure. Within the encoder in this figure, each layer consists of multiple nodes, and the outputs of the last hidden layer in the encoder are the abstract features. The decoder has a structure with multiple layers, each of which is symmetrical to its corresponding layer in the encoder.
For illustration purposes, consider an AE in which the encoder and the decoder have one hidden layer. In this case, the encoder maps input features to abstract features using the hidden layer [12] . Assuming that a given input feature vector is x = [x 0 · · · x L−1 ] and each of its elements is binary 
where φ e (·), W e , and b e denote the activation function employed in the encoder, an L × H weight matrix, and a 1 × H bias vector, respectively. Note that the activation function is a non-linear function, such as a sigmoid function, hyper-tangent function, or rectified linear unit (ReLU) [12] .
The decoder receives h and produces the output vector
where φ d (·), W d , and b d denote an activation function, which is a sigmoid function to make the output value lie between 0 and 1, an H × L weight matrix, and a 1 × L bias vector, respectively. For given N training samples, an optimization technique is applied such that
is minimized by adjusting the set of all weights as
l denote the element l in training sample n and its corresponding element in the reconstructed output vector, respectively [12] . Note that BCE is the cross entropy of the distribution of x with respect to the distribution ofx. The BCE of (3) is always greater than or equal to the entropy of x, and they are equal if and only if the distributions of x andx are equivalent [26, Sec. 3.13] . Thus, the value of BCE decreases as the distribution ofx becomes similar to that of x.
The AE can be employed for anomaly detection. For instance, consider the detection of an anomalous digit in the Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology (MNIST) dataset, which is a dataset of handwritten digits used for training image processing systems [27, Ch. 3] . Assuming that the digit '7' is an anomaly, we will try to identify it among the digits as '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '8', and '9'. Toward this end, the AE is trained by minimizing (3) using the images of the normal digits excluding '7'. Once it is trained, we can detect the anomalous digit '7' on the basis of the expectation that its BCE is significantly larger than those of normal digits.
B. BASIC STRUCTURE OF CAE
When raw image or speech data are input into ordinary feedforward neural networks with multiple hidden fully connected layers, a large number of weights are required to be trained [28] , because the number of input dimensions is typically large and the number of weights in each hidden layer is the product of the numbers of its input and output nodes. The large number of weights results in a high computational load. In addition, fully connected structures are likely to ignore the topology of the input data. In other words, the input data in any fixed order can be presented without affecting the training outcome [28] . As pixels (or variables) in images (or timefrequency representations of speech) are highly correlated spatially or temporally, a CNN has been proposed to extract and combine abstract features to recognize spatial or temporal objects by adopting convolution, an activation function, and pooling [28] . Moreover, a structure with these operations can significantly reduce the number of weights; hence, tasks can be executed very efficiently. Fig. 2 shows an example of a CNN structure for the classification of 24 × 24 pixel color images. Because a 24 × 24 pixel color input image has three channels (i.e., red, green, and blue), it is denoted as 3 × 24 × 24 (channel × height × width). The operations of convolution, activation function, and max-pooling produce local features. For instance, when the input image is convolved with 5 × 5 kernels supporting three input channels and six output channels, it is transformed into the local features of size 6 × 20 × 20. After applying the activation function, the max-pooling operation, which chooses one maximum value among 2 × 2 non-overlapping pixel areas at each of the local features, is applied; hence, they are transformed into 6 × 10 × 10 local features. While executing these processes repeatedly through multiple layers, the CNN can extract more abstract local features. Finally, it can classify a given image by combining the local features using the fully connected layers. Note that a supervised training technique, which requires a large set of labeled training images, is required to perform this classification task [28] . As discussed above, the CNN has been successfully shown to classify images and recognize speech data with a reduced computational load [29] . However, it cannot be used for anomaly detection because a set of labeled data is required to train it. Nevertheless, the layers in CNN, such as convolution and max-pooling layers are adopted instead of fullyconnected layers in the AE, because abstract features can be efficiently extracted using unsupervised learning [20] . For example, a fully connected layer can be employed if 3 × 24 × 24 color image is transformed into one-dimensional data with 1, 728 elements. However, it requires an extremely high computational load compared to a convolution layer. Specifically, the number of weights to be trained in the fully connected layer is 1, 728 × the number of its output dimensions, while the number of weights in the first convolution layer in Fig. 2 is only 450 (= 5 · 5 · 3 · 6). Because the CAE adopts the layers in CNN, such as convolution and maxpooling layers instead of fully-connected layers in the AE, the CAE can be employed for the anomalous digit image detection using an unsupervised learning with normal images like AE as described in Section II-A. Fig. 3 shows an example of this CAE structure. In this figure, the encoder extracts abstract features through multiple convolution, max-pooling, and fully connected layers. The decoder reconstructs the input image through multiple fully connected, max-unpooling, and transposed convolution layers. Note that each layer in the decoder corresponding to that in the encoder is placed in the reverse order of the encoder layers. In particular, the fully connected, max-unpooling, and transposed convolution layers in the decoder correspond to the fully connected, max-pooling, and convolution layers in the encoder, respectively. In addition, the input and output dimensions of each layer are inverted compared to those of the encoder, because the decoder produces the output image with the same size as the input. Each layer in the decoder is described in detail as follows. The transposed convolution layer performs a transformation in the opposite direction of a normal convolution layer [30] . Specifically, for a given normal convolution, the corresponding transposed convolution works by swapping the forward and backward passes of it. The max-unpooling layer performs a transformation in the opposite direction of a given max-pooling layer. In particular, it uses switches that record the location of the local maximum in each non-overlapping max-pooling region in the given max-pooling layer and places it in the same location as the original region [31] .
When the input image is binary and N training images are given, an optimization technique minimizes
by adjusting the set of all the weights in the CAE, where
, and L denote a pixel (m, l) of channel k in training input image n, its corresponding pixel in the reconstructed output image, the number of channels in the image, the number of pixels in the width of the image, and the number of pixels in the height of the image, respectively. As discussed in Section II-A, the BCE becomes smaller as the distribution of the reconstructed image becomes similar to that of the input image. Moreover, it is expected that the BCE of a given image that is not similar to the training images will be large.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME FOR HTTP ANOMALY DETECTION
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme for detecting anomalous HTTP messages. Toward this end, we first describe how an HTTP message is transformed into a character-level binary image. Then, we describe the proposed CAE structure using this transformed image. In addition, we define BCE and BCV as decision variables to determine whether a given message is normal or anomalous. To investigate the validity of this transformation, we describe how a character embedding technique can be applied to the character-level image transformation.
A. CHARACTER-LEVEL IMAGE TRANSFORMATION
For the CAE, an HTTP message needs to be transformed into a binary image. Toward this end, we adopt the character-level binary image transformation technique as proposed in [19] . Specifically, 68 characters including 26 lowercase alphabets, 10 numbers, and 32 symbols, illustrated as in the message, are allowed to be transformed. Note that the uppercase alphabets are converted into lowercase before the transformation. Furthermore, the characters in the message are arranged in a reverse order as proposed in [19] , so that the latest read character in the network is always near the beginning of the output. This makes it easy for the fully connected layers to associate weights with the latest read character [19] .
The maximum allowable length of the message is L and any character exceeding it is ignored. As a result, the message is transformed into 68 × 1 × L (i.e., 1 × L-dimensional image with 68 channels). For the transformation, first, consider an all-zero 68 × 1 × L image. For the given k th character within the allowed characters, all its positions within the message are found. Then, their corresponding positions of channel k in the image are changed to 1.
The detailed image transformation is as follows. Fig. 4 shows an example of character-level binary image transformation that alters a message of 'cbcfga' for the allowable characters of 'abcdef' and L = 7 into an image of size 6 × 1 × 7. Toward this end, the message is converted in reverse order as 'agfcbc'. Because the 0 th character in the allowed characters, 'a', is at position 0 in the message, channel 0 of the image x 0 is converted as Fig. 5 shows the structure of the proposed scheme. Compared with the basic CAE structure outlined in Section II-B, the encoder is a modified version of Inception-ResNet-v2, which achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on the ILSVRC benchmark [22] . Because the original structure only receives a two-dimensional image with three channels, we modified it to receive a one-dimensional image with 68 channels. As described in Section II-B, each layer in the decoder corresponding to that in the encoder is placed in the reverse order of the encoder layers. Note that a dropout module with a drop rate of 0.2 is placed between the encoder and the decoder to reduce overfitting [22] , [32] . Unlike a typical CAE, the decoder is not easily constructed, because the encoder structure is complicated. The basic relation between each layer of the encoder and the decoder is explained in Appendix. In addition, the detailed schematic diagrams of all the layers are provided.
B. PROPOSED CAE STRUCTURE
Considering the structure of the modified version of Inception-ResNet-v2, the maximum allowed message length of L satisfies the relation
where L * denotes the output width of the Inception-ResNet-C layer in the proposed network structure shown in Fig. 5 . Table 1 summarizes the output dimensions of each layer. We trained the structure to minimize the BCE of (4) using normal HTTP messages. The detailed training process will be described in Section V-A.
C. DETECTION METHODS
Typically, an AE-based anomaly detection scheme employs BCE as a decision variable. Specifically, an anomalous signal is detected if its BCE is larger than a prespecified threshold value [27, Ch. 3] . However, the detection performance can be improved if other decision variables for detecting anomalous messages are employed for a given message. For the image transformation process described in Section III-A, it is likely that the number of pixels of 1 is small in each channel of the image, as the number of any given character in the message is negligible compared to L. Thus, when the image of a normal message is reconstructed, it is likely that most of its pixels have near-zero values. For this reason, the mean and variance of pixels in the normal image are expected to be small. By contrast, when the image of an anomalous message is reconstructed, it is likely that most of its pixels have various values. Because variance is a squared measure of how far the data values deviate from the mean on average, it is expected that the variance of mean of the pixels are large. Thus, anomaly detection can also be performed using this property.
Toward this end, first recall that BCE is the cross entropy of the distribution of input pixel x with respect to the distribution of output pixelx, as discussed in Section II-B. When x and x are assumed to be binary random variables, BCE can be formally written as
where E x [·] denotes the expectation under the distribution of x. However, it seems that BCE does not reflect the variance property. Thus, we introduce BCV as
as defined in [23] , where V x [·] denotes the variance under the distribution of x. Because it is expressed using the variance, BCV is expected to reflect the variance property. As the input image is a 1-dimensional binary image of an HTTP message (i.e., M = 1 and x (n) k0l ∈ [0, 1]) with K channels, as shown in Section III-A, BCE and BCV for a given input image n are
and
respectively. Consequently, we can determine image n as anomalous if (8) or (9) is larger than a prespecified threshold.
D. TRANSFORMATION USING CHARACTER EMBEDDING
The size of the character-level transformed image can be reduced using a character embedding technique. Because the character embedding can exploit the correlation between the characters within text data, it has been adopted in document classification [33] , [34] , sentiment analysis [35] , and language modeling [36] , [37] . The character embedding process is explained as follows. First, consider the transformed image of size 68 × 1 × L. Equivalently, this image consists of L one-hot vectors of size 68 × 1. Then, each one-hot vector is mapped into one of 68 vectors of size C × 1 (for C < 68) Because the character embedding reduces the number of channels of the transformed image only, it can be adopted in the CAE without any modification [33] . However, BCE and BCV cannot be directly computed in this case, because they are computed only when the input is binary (i.e., when it consists of ones and zeros), as shown in (8) and (9). Thus, we need to transform the output image of the CAE into an image with the same size as the binary character-level transformed image, i.e., 68 × 1 × L. Then, BCE and BCV can be computed using the transformed output and its corresponding binary character-level transformed image. Toward this end, we adopt 1 × 1 convolution having C input channels and 68 output channels at the output of the CAE [22] , [38] . Specifically, this convolution transforms each vector of size C × 1 at the output of the CAE into a vector of size 68 × 1. To investigate its effect on the character-level image transformation, we compare its performance with that without the character embedding in Section V-B.
IV. SCHEMES FOR COMPARISON
In this section, we describe schemes for comparison with the proposed scheme, including a CREPE-based CAE, a oneclass SVM, and an IF. Note that the one-class SVM and IF require heuristically selected input features from HTTP messages. We also describe how to configure a set of input features heuristically.
A. CREPE-BASED CAE
CREPE uses a CNN structure for document classification, in which documents are transformed into images at the character level, as described in Section III-A [19] . It consists of six convolution layers and two fully connected layers. Using the output of the last layer, a softmax function is employed to classify documents [19] . In addition, as with the proposed network structure, the maximum allowed message length of L satisfies the relation as
where L † denotes the output width of the last convolution layer.
The CREPE-based CAE consists of an encoder, whose structure is equivalent to that of CREPE, and a decoder, where each layer corresponding to that of the encoder is placed in the reverse order of the encoder layers. This scheme minimizes the BCE of the input and output images, as in (4). Table 2 summarizes the output dimension of each layer of the CREPE-based CAE.
B. HEURISTIC CONFIGURATION OF INPUT FEATURES
Conventional unsupervised learning schemes, such as a oneclass SVM [24] and an IF [25] , require the input features that are manually chosen. In this section, we describe the configuration of input features reflecting the characteristics of HTTP messages. Unlike the proposed scheme, anomalous messages (as well as normal messages) are analyzed, as the configuration of the input features needs to reflect the differences between the characteristics of normal and anomalous messages. The selected input features include keywords in structured query language (SQL) injection as well as cross-site scripting (XSS) and other web attacks, and uniform resource identifier (URI) patterns [39] , [40] . For instance, because specific characters and their combinations appear repeatedly in anomalous HTTP messages, they can be considered as the input feature [41] . Furthermore, in URI, words-related numbers (such as the total number of words and maximum length of words) are also considered as input features [39] , [40] . Table 3 From the experimental results (not presented in this paper), it was observed that good attack detection performance is achieved with this configuration when training is performed using labeled data.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
In this section, we explain the details of the HTTP messages and the performance metrics used in the experiments. Using these metrics, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with that of the other schemes.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
We collected around 155, 000 HTTP messages from more than 600 websites in 2018 for this experiment. Security engineers from Penta Security Systems Inc. deliberately reviewed the collected messages to classify them as normal or anomalous messages. The numbers of normal and anomalous HTTP messages were around 147,000 and 8,000, respectively. The training set consisted of around 129,000 randomly selected normal messages. The test set consisted of the remaining messages, i.e., around 18,000 normal messages and 8,000 anomalous messages. The average number of characters in an HTTP message was around 744, and 94.4% of the messages had less than 1, 000 characters. Using (5), we set the maximum allowed message length of L to 1067 (i.e., L * = 32 in (5)); hence, most of the messages could be transformed into images without ignoring any characters. Similarly, L for the CREPE-based CAE scheme was set to 1014 (i.e., L † = 34 in (10)). In addition, the network of the proposed scheme was trained using the PyTorch on 4 NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs [42] . In particular, the RMSProp optimization technique was adopted with a decay of 0.9, = 1.0, and batch size of 32 [43] . We used an initial learning rate of 0.045 and decayed it at every fourth epoch with an exponential rate of 0.94 over 100 epochs.
As performance metrics, we used the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) [44, Sec. 19.7] . TPR is the ratio of the number of anomalous messages correctly determined as anomalous (i.e., true positives) to the total number of actual anomalous messages. FPR is the ratio of the number of normal messages incorrectly determined as anomalous (i.e., false positives) to the total number of actual normal messages. On the basis of these metrics, we employed a receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve [44, Sec. 19.7] . The ROC curve was obtained by plotting the TPR against FPR at various threshold settings. Note that the ROC curve is a graphical plot showing the diagnostic ability of a detection system, as various threshold values can be used to detect an anomaly. Furthermore, for comparison purposes, we employed area under the curve (AUC) to convert the curve into a single numerical value. Because the value of AUC is evaluated as the normalized area under a given ROC curve, a perfect detector has an AUC value of 1 and a typical detector can have various values of AUC ranging between 0 and 1 [44, Sec. 19.7] . Thus, a detector with a higher AUC value could be considered as superior when compared to other detectors with a lower AUC value.
In addition, some previous studies have shown that AUC has some limitations in terms of performance evaluation, especially when the numbers of normal and anomalous messages are significantly different [45] , [46] . Therefore, we employed the F-measure [47] and Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) [48] . Specifically, the F-measure is the harmonic average of the precision and TPR (or recall),
where the precision is the ratio of the number of anomalous messages correctly determined to the number of messages determined as anomalous. Note that the F-measure reaches its maximum value of 1 when the values of precision and recall are 1 and its minimum value of 0 when any value of precision and recall is 0. The MCC is a balanced measure for imbalance classes, defined as
where TP, FP, TN, and FN denote the number of anomalous messages correctly determined as anomalous, the number of normal messages incorrectly determined as anomalous, the number of normal messages correctly determined as normal, and the number of anomalous messages incorrectly determined as normal, respectively. In addition, the MCC is a correlation coefficient between the true and predicted classes, and its range is between +1 and −1. A perfect detector has a coefficient value of +1 and a random detector has a coefficient value of 0. In addition, a coefficient value of −1 is obtained when the true and predicted classes are in total disagreement. Fig. 6 shows empirical cumulative density functions (CDFs) of BCE and BCV to verify the validity of using BCV in the detection. The proposed scheme was trained using a training set consisting of only normal messages over 100 epochs. Then, the test set with normal and anomalous messages was used to evaluate the empirical CDF. We see that the BCV difference between the normal and anomalous messages is larger than the corresponding BCE difference, which implies that the detection performance is improved if BCV is employed as the decision variable. Fig. 7 shows the FPR performance with the number of epochs at a TPR of 0.99. As expected, the FPR values of BCE and BCV tend to decrease with the number of epochs, converging at around 0.04. We also see that the use of BCV leads to universally better performance compared to VOLUME 6, 2018 the use of BCE. Fig. 8 shows the AUC performance with the number of epochs. We see that the AUC values tend to decrease with the number of epochs. Moreover, the AUC values of BCV are universally larger than those of BCE. From Figs. 7 and 8 , we see that the use of BCV is beneficial for anomaly detection compared to the use of BCE. In addition, to investigate the validity of the image transformation described in Section III-A, the FPR and AUC values of the character embedding of size C = 16 are shown in these figures. The performance improvement due to the character embedding is negligible compared to the proposed scheme. Thus, the character embedding is not significantly useful for CAE-based anomaly detection, although it requires an additional computational load due to the embedding process. Fig. 9 compares the ROC performance of the proposed scheme with that of the CREPE-based CAE, one-class SVM, and IF. The proposed scheme and CREPE-based CAE were trained over 100 epochs. We see that the performance of the proposed scheme using BCV is universally better than that of the proposed scheme using BCE and the other schemes. We can also see that the performance of the CREPE-based CAE is worse than that of the proposed scheme, even though it employs the same character-level transformed image. Moreover, the use of BCV in the CREPE-AE leads to better performance compared to the use of BCE only when the value of TPR is low. Thus, BCV is a suitable decision variable only when a sufficiently deep CAE structure is employed. Furthermore, the performance of the one-class SVM and IF, which use the heuristically selected features listed in Table 3 , is degraded, although they are suitable for supervised learning-based attack detection, as discussed in Section IV-B. Thus, we see that feature selection using heuristics may easily cause performance limitations in anomaly detection. In addition, the performance improvement due to the character embedding is negligible. Specifically, its performance using BCV is slightly better than that of the proposed scheme, when the value of TPR is lower than around 0.97 and higher than around 0.995. Table 4 summarizes the FPR, F-measure, and MCC at TPRs of 0.9 and 0.99 as well as the AUC. In this table, we see that the FPR values of the proposed scheme using BCV at TPRs of 0.9 and 0.99 are reduced by around 35% and 30% compared to those in the case of using BCE, respectively. Moreover, the performance in terms of the FPR, F-measure, and MCC of the proposed scheme is universally improved, compared to that of the other schemes. In particular, at a TPR of 0.99, the performance of the other schemes is severely degraded, even though the values of their AUCs are greater than at least 0.935. For instance, the FPR values of the proposed scheme using BCV at TPRs of 0.9 and 0.99 are reduced by around 50% and 85% compared to those of the CREPE-based CAE, respectively. The performance of the character embedding is as follows. As expected from Fig. 9, FIGURE 12 . Illustrations of the third relation of each layer in the encoder (a) and its corresponding layer in the decoder (b). its performance is slightly better than that of the proposed scheme at a TPR of 0.9, while it is slightly degraded at a TPR of 0.99.
B. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
Finally, we compared the performance of the proposed scheme with that of a CNN which is trained using a supervised learning. In the CNN, the CREPE network structure was employed [19] . Because the CNN requires labeled data (i.e., normal and anomalous messages) for training, around 55,000 additional anomalous messages besides the normal messages were included in the training set. After training for 100 epochs, its performance was measured using the same test set as that of the proposed scheme. The FPR, TPR, F-measure, and MCC of the CNN were 0.0020, 0.9983, 0.9987, and 0.9957, respectively. Note that its performance improved significantly compared to that of the proposed scheme, because the types of anomalous messages in the training set of the CNN were similar to those in the test set. However, the performance of the CNN on new types of anomalous messages would be degraded. Thus, to maintain the performance, anomalous messages of new types should be regularly collected, and it should be re-trained using them. On the other hand, the performance of the proposed scheme would be maintained, because it is trained using only normal messages. Owing to these complementary properties, we expect web application services to be protected against known and unknown types of attacks more robustly if both the properties are suitably combined. However, more additional research is required to find how they are effectively combined. Therefore, we would like to earmark this work as a future research topic.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a CAE-based anomaly detection method for HTTP messages on the basis of characterlevel binary image transformation. Existing anomaly detection schemes require heuristically selected input features. In addition, they are likely to lead to performance limitations if they are selected without carefully understanding the characteristics of the messages. To mitigate this problem, we used images transformed from characters in HTTP messages as the input features for the CAE. Moreover, the CAE was a modified version of Inception-ResNet-v2, which contributed to further improvement in performance. The experimental results showed that the performance of the proposed scheme improved significantly if BCV was employed as the decision variable instead of BCE. In addition, the proposed scheme was shown to significantly outperform the CREPEbased CAE scheme as well as conventional unsupervised machine learning schemes, such as a one-class SVM and an IF. Finally, to investigate the validity of character-level image transformation, we employed a character embedding in the transformation. Then, we showed that its performance improvement is negligible although it requires additional computational load.
APPENDIX BASIC RELATION BETWEEN EACH LAYER OF THE ENCODER AND THE DECODER OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Here, we describe the basic relation between each layer of the encoder and the decoder of the proposed scheme, when the decoder was designed for the given encoder. Then, we provide the details of the layers constituting the proposed network structure.
Figs. 10, 11, 12 illustrate the three basic relations of the layer structures between the encoder and the decoder. Each relation is explained as follows. In Fig. 10 (a) , it is observed that the 'Filter Concat.' module is employed, which concatenates the outputs of the below P modules in a given layer of the encoder. In this case, the 'Filter Split' module in Fig. 10 (b) is employed to split the corresponding signal into P signals and provide each of them to the corresponding module in the layer of the decoder. In Fig. 11 (a) , the 'Origin Module' module sends the same signal to the above P modules in a given layer of the encoder. In this case, the 'Mean' module is employed to average the signals from the corresponding P modules in the layer of the decoder before sending them to the corresponding 'Origin Module' in the decoder, as shown in Fig. 11 (b) . Finally, in Fig. 12 (a) , the output of module p is scaled by c p in a given layer of the encoder. In this case, the corresponding module p in the decoder receives the signal scaled by (1/c p ), as shown in Fig. 12 (b) .
Using these three basic relations, we show the detailed schematic diagrams of each layer in the proposed scheme as follows. Figs. 13, 14, 15, 16 , 17, and 18 show schematic diagrams of all the layers in the proposed network structure shown in Fig. 5 . As described in [22] , the number in each block in these figures denotes the number of output channels. A convolution block without 'Linear', 'Sigmoid', or 'V' denotes a zero-padded convolution, as described in [26, Sec. 9.5] with the activation function of ReLU. A convolution block marked with 'Linear' denotes a zero-padded convolution without the activation function. A convolution block marked with 'Sigmoid' denotes a zero-padded convolution with the activation function of sigmoid. A convolution block marked with 'V' denotes a valid convolution with the activation function of ReLU [26, Sec. 9.5]. Furthermore, blocks of transposed convolution are defined similarly to those of convolution. Finally, note that we make the output value of the decoder lie between 0 and 1 by employing the sigmoid activation function in the block before the output layer, as shown in Fig. 13 (b) .
